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Advocates of microlending suggest it is a sustainable intervention that reaches the poor 
directly and offers them the means to invest and improve their incomes (Khavul, 2010; Morduch, 
1999; Yunus, 2007); yet,  impact studies of these int rventions have suggested they often have 
little or even a detrimental impact on borrowers (Van Rooyen, Stewart & De Wet, 2012). This 
dissertation examines the efforts to promote entrepreneurship and alleviate poverty in developing 
countries through microlending. I begin by reviewing the microlending literature, and in 
particular, impact studies of the effect microlending s having in developing countries.  Next, I 
review theory and empirical evidence that suggests innovation is an important mediating 
mechanism through which capital access may contribute to poverty alleviation.  Subsequently, I 
put forth a person-situation interactional model to explain, at least in part, how two commonly 
implemented parts of microlending – incremental loans nd joint liability – may negatively 
impact innovation adoption and reduce the relationship between capital access and poverty 
alleviation. 
 To empirically test this model, structured interviws were conducted with 340 borrowers 
of both individual and group-based microloans in Ethiopia across three different microlending 
organizations and 11 locations.  The findings are consistent with a sorting effect in that 
innovative individuals appear more likely to take individual loans than group loans.  
Additionally, the results are also consistent with a social pressure effect where innovative 
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Productivity isn’t everything, but in the long run it is almost 
everything.  A country’s ability to improve its stand rd of living 
over time depends almost entirely on its ability to raise its output 
per worker. 




Beginning in the 1950’s, it was noted the rural poor suffer from a lack of access to formal 
credit, and the informal credit available had very high interest rates and were often short-term in 
nature, which inhibits long-term productive investment (Gonzalez-Vega, 1994: 5).  The belief 
was, and in large part still is, that if the poor were provided reasonable access to credit they 
would be able to act entrepreneurially and grow their incomes to pull themselves out of poverty 
(Bradley, McMullen, Artz & Simiyu, 2012).  Seeking to improve credit access, development 
strategies in least developed countries (LDCs) from the 1950’s up to the 1980’s often included 
subsidized credit to the poor (Morduch, 1999).  However, these interventions were “nearly all 
disasters” in that repayments rates often dropped below 50 percent, and credit was often directed 
to the politically well-connected (Morduch, 1999; 1570).  In the last few decades, microlending, 
which represents a new method of offering financial services, has gained prominence as the 
intervention of choice to stimulate economic growth and alleviate poverty (Pellegrina, 2011; 
Khavul, 2010).  
Microlending was developed in the late 1970’s as a new way to provide financial services 
to the “unbankable” poor of the world (Yunus, 2007).  It combines group lending with 
incremental loans in an attempt to overcome the repayment rate problems that made previous 




improved repayment rates to where many microlending organizations report rates in excess of 95 
percent (Khavul, 2010).  In spite of the success of microlending in improving repayment rates, 
the social and economic benefit of providing loans to the poor is increasingly being questioned 
(Duvendack & Palmer-Jones, 2011).  A recent randomized control trial by Karlan and Zinman 
(2011) suggests borrowers are marginally worse off as evidenced by a reduction in the number of 
reported employees and lower self-evaluations of well-being.  Additionally, other studies suggest 
microlending has a negligible impact on physical asset , savings, health care, education 
(Coleman, 1999), income, consumption, or the likelihood of sending children to school 
(Morduch, 1998).   
Exacerbating this debate is the recent large increase in for-profit microlenders that do not 
necessarily hold social and economic benefit for the poor as an underlying motive to provide 
microloans.  However, for the purposes of this study I leave aside the larger question of the 
ethical and moral implications of for-profit lending to the poor.  Rather, I take the social and 
economic impacts of microlending as a topic of interest as a given.  Along these lines, the lack of 
rigorous empirical evidence of the positive impacts of microlending, begs the question of 
whether the founding assumption of microlending is flawed, or whether there are other factors 
preventing the benefits from being realized?   
To answer this question, I begin by providing an overview of the microlending literature.  
Next, I explore how credit access is proposed to improve the lives of the poor.  Although 
increasing entrepreneurship has been cited as the mechanism by which microlending may reduce 
poverty (Khavul, 2010; Yunus, 2007), little scholarly work has attempted to integrate the 
literature on entrepreneurially related economic growth with the microlending literature.  As 




related empirical evidence.  In particular, I outline the mediating mechanism of innovation 
adoption that leads to productivity increases, which has been identified as a key factor between 
capital access and economic growth (Aghion, Howitt & Mayer-Foulkes, 2005).   
Next, I review the literature on the individual determinants of innovation adoption to 
assess whether the structure of microlending may be inhibiting this part of the causal chain.  I 
then propose a person-situation interactional model.  This model theorizes how incremental loans 
and group lending may be impacting innovation adoption among borrowers.  Lastly, I test this 
model with data gathered through semi-structured interviews with microloan borrowers in 
Ethiopia. 
This research seeks to contribute to the literature in a number of ways.  Although the 
microlending literature references and tests theories on how group lending reduces default rates 
(Hermes & Lensink, 2007; Stiglitz, 1990; Varian, 1990), the literature lacks a robust discussion 
of how the structure of interventions intended to improve credit access among the poor may 
affect the ultimate goal of poverty alleviation.  By integrating the entrepreneurship related 
growth literature with the microlending literature, this research seeks to provide a framework 
from which a systematic research stream can be developed to assess and understand the impact 
of microlending on poverty alleviation. 
Additionally, although some research has explored topics related to social capital within 
microlending groups (e.g. Cassar, Crowley & Wydick, 2007; Besley & Coates, 1995), there is a 
complete dearth of research into how group lending may impact investment decisions.  The ways 
in which the poor invest their loans inevitably has a ignificant impact on outcomes; therefore, 
this area of research is critical to understanding the impacts of microlending on poverty 




and testing them. 
Finally, this research seeks to contribute to the practice of microlending by discussing 
practical approaches to improve the efficacy of loans in achieving the productivity gains 
necessary to improve the standard of living among the poor. 
 




Microlending has experienced incredible growth over th  past several decades. 
Thousands of organizations have loaned billions of dollars in microloans to millions of poor 
individuals (Daley-Harris, 2009).  The concept of microloans originated when Muhammad 
Yunus—the founder of Grameen Bank and Nobel Peace Priz winner—noticed in his work in 
Bangladesh that the poor lacked the capital to purchase the raw materials necessary for them to 
work (Yunus, 2007).  As a result, the poor often tur ed to local moneylenders who charged 
exorbitant interest rates, often in excess of 100 percent (Bruton, Khavul & Chavez, 2011).  
Yunus believed that a small loan of just a few dollars at a more reasonable interest rate would 
significantly improve the lives of the poor (Yunus, 2007).   
However, the transaction costs involved in administer ng many small loans, determining 
the creditworthiness of potential borrowers, and enforcing timely repayment would be cost 
prohibitive for such small amounts (Morduch, 1999).  To reduce transaction costs Yunus (2007) 
decided to bundle the small loans into groups.  Furthermore, he found that asking individuals to 
self-select into these groups served as a tool to determine creditworthiness (Morduch, 1999; 
Yunus, 2007).  Potential borrowers knew each other and would only select those who were 




Yunus also offered the groups the opportunity of taking out larger loans in the future only 
if the group loan was paid in full (Yunus, 2007).  This provided an incentive to members of the 
group to apply social pressure, if necessary, to any group members who might become 
delinquent on their loans to continue making payments (Hermes et al., 2007).  This informal 
social pressure served as a mechanism to enforce the t rms of the loan without the microlending 
institution having to incur additional costs (Morduch, 1999).  
The model that Yunus created has become the foundatio  of microlending, with most 
lenders utilizing some form of group lending and incremental loans (Pellegrina, 2011).  Group 
lending typically entails small groups of individuals coming together to take individual loans, 
and the possibility of taking out future loans is contingent on the entire group paying off their 
debt.  Meetings typically occur weekly or bi-weekly in order to collect loan payments (Khavul, 
2010). These meetings are often held in public and continue until all of the loan obligations are 
met.  Overall, this novel structure of group lending has reduced the transaction costs of providing 
loans to the poor to a point that it was scaled up to the size we see today.  Between 1997 and 
2005, the number of microlending organizations worldwide rose from 618 to 3,133, and the 
number of people who receive microloans increased from 13.5 million to 113.3 million over the 
same time period (Hermes et al., 2007). 
It is important to note that I am specifically using the term “microlending” rather than 
“microfinance”, because microfinance often references other financial services, such as deposit 
accounts and insurance.  Although these other financ al services deserve investigation in their 








The microlending literature can be organized around three major themes.  The first 
stream has proposed and investigated theories regardin  how group lending reduces default rates.  
Most notably, this literature has suggested that group lending reduces agency costs and 
information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders by locating the screening, monitoring, 
and enforcement mechanisms at the community level wh re group members know each other 
(Banerjee et al., 1994; Hermes et al., 2007; Stiglitz, 1990; Varian, 1990).   
The second stream has focused on the trade-off between sustainability and outreach to the 
poor.  Most microlending organizations depend on subsidies to offset the costs of providing 
loans to the poor (Hermes et al., 2011).  The financial systems model suggests that microlenders 
need to charge higher interest rates and limit outreach in order to be self-sufficient.  Proponents 
of this view suggest financial sustainability is important to the long-term survival of 
microlending institutions, and longevity is importan  to the industry’s long-term impact on 
poverty alleviation.  The poverty lending approach suggests raising interest rates and limiting 
outreach reduces the efficacy of microlending in reducing poverty (Hermes et al., 2011).  
Proponents of this view suggest donors desire social impact and are willing to forego financial 
gains or even endure losses to achieve this mission. 
Assessing impact is the third identifiable stream of research in the microlending 
literature.  However, in spite of the many articles on microlending’s impact there are few 
academic articles as suggested by the following quote fr m Coleman (1999) “[m]ost existing 
impact studies are nonacademic project evaluations hat are of a descriptive nature or suffer from 




While advocacy articles that trumpet “scientific” findings about the impact of 
microlending are problematic to the understanding ad development of the industry, more 
problematic are the clearly academic articles that suffer untold methodological issues, which do 
not appropriately capture the actual impact.  The primary methodological flaw of early 
microlending studies was selection bias (Coleman, 1999; Karlan et al., 2011).  Microlending 
institutions do not randomly select the locations of their branches, and borrowers are not 
randomly selected from the population.  This makes it difficult to tease out and isolate the effect 
of the individual, the village, and the microloan o borrower outcomes (Berhane & Garderbroek, 
2011; Coleman, 1999; Duvendack et al., 2011). 
An additional issue in measuring the impact of microlending is that there is little 
consensus about what an appropriate outcome to measure is. The income of poor individuals in 
developing countries is difficult to measure, because it is often highly variable, and there are few, 
if any, records kept (Collier, 2007; Collins, Morduch, Rutherford & Ruthven, 2009). 
Additionally,  development economists have suggested poverty alleviation should be measured 
in terms of the welfare of the poor (Sen, 1988), which is not necessarily highly correlated with 
income and may include other factors, such as life expectancy, education levels, nutrition, access 
to health care, and crime rates.  This has led to a variety of outcomes being measured in the few 
academic empirical studies of microlending’s impact.  While I discuss these various outcomes in 
my review of microlending impact studies, the primary focus of this study is on understanding 
the economic impact of microlending, which I feel is more generalizable across microlending 
interventions than social impacts, such as women’s mpowerment and children’s education rates, 





Some of the issues of measurement with early microlending impact studies can be 
demonstrated by using the example of Pitt and Khandker (1998).  This study is often pointed to 
as empirical evidence that microlending has a positive impact on the lives of the poor (Basher, 
2010; Demirguc-Kunt & Levine, 2009; Hermes et al., 2011).  The data from this study suggested 
microlending improved consumption by 18 percent for w men and 11 percent for men, but the 
methodology has been questioned because of the cross-sectional nature of the data and the 
instrument used to control for selection bias (Karlan & Zinman, 2011; Khandker, 2005; 
McIntosh, Villaran & Wydick, 2011).  Pitt and Khandker (1998) used the stated land owning 
eligibility requirement of microlenders to control f r selection bias by finding a population 
slightly above and below the requirements.  Unfortuna ely, it has been demonstrated that loan 
officers often fudge the eligibility requirement, which compromises the efficacy of this 
instrument (McIntosh et al., 2011).  Revised estimates of the impacts of microlending by 
Khandker (2005) using panel data from the same sample used in Pitt and Khandker’s (1998) 
previous study suggests the long-term impact of microlending is about half of the original 
estimates.   
While the Khandker studies employed the eligibility requirements as an instrument to 
control for selection bias, other studies that have us d a specific study design to control for 
selection bias have often found little or no evidence of a positive impact of microlending on the 
welfare of the poor.  For instance, Coleman (1999) designed a study where villages that were 
selected as future sites for microlending institution branches were used as a control sample.  
Moreover, villagers were able to construct their microlending groups within these villages prior 
to the establishment of the branches and disbursement of the loans.  This design not only helped 




the selection bias of the individuals that self-select to become borrowers.  The results suggested 
no significant impact of microlending on improving household incomes, physical assets, savings, 
sales, labor, health care, or education (Coleman, 1999).   
Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster and Kinnan (2009) used ran omized treatment and control 
groups to account for potential selection bias.  In co junction with a microfinance institution, 
Banerjee et al. (2009) randomly assigned half the neighborhoods of Hyderabad, India to receive 
promotions related to the services of the microlender while the other half did not.  They found 
evidence that suggests microlending increases the number of business startups, the purchase of 
durable goods, and higher profits among previously existing businesses, but they found no effect 
on overall consumption in contrast to the Khandker (1998, 2005) studies. 
Karlan and Zinman (2011) also attempted to control for selection bias when they 
randomly assigned marginally acceptable borrowers to eceive or not receive loans.  They found 
that many borrowers were marginally worse off as evid nced by fewer employees after taking a 
loan and lower self-reported ratings of subjective well-being.  Additionally, female borrowers 
showed no significant difference in profitability after taking the loans while male borrowers and 
relatively high income borrowers did show an increase. 
Pelligrina (2011) attempted to compare the impact of microlending to two other forms of 
credit: formal bank loans and informal credit.  This type of study is important in order to 
demonstrate the unique benefits of microlending, and her data suggests microlending is primarily 
used to increase working capital while bank loans improve the acquisition of fixed assets 
(Hermes & Lensink, 2011; Pelligrina, 2011).  She gos n to suggest that the acquisition of fixed 
assets is more likely to improve long-term income du to borrowers’ ability to generate long-




characteristics of microloans and bank loans are likely to account for the difference.  Microloans 
generally have short and regular repayment schedules and utilize the group lending method that 
may push borrowers seeking long-term investments to u e formal bank loans that, in her study, 
offered balloon payments and an individual lending method. 
A review of multiple studies on the impact of microedit in Sub-Saharan Africa (Van 
Rooyen, Stewart & de Wet, 2012) found that although one study demonstrated marginal 
financial benefits for borrowers (Ashraf, Gine & Karlan, 2008), others demonstrated a negligible 
impact or a positive and negative impact on borrower incomes (Barnes, Gaile & Kibombo, 2001; 
Barnes, Keogh & Nemarundwe, 2001; Gubert & Roubaud, 2005; Nanor, 2008). 
Ashraf et al., (2008) reviewed the benefits of providing credit and training in export crops 
to rural farmers in Kenya.  While they found farmers increased their incomes, it has been 
suggested this was largely attributable to the export cr p training rather than access to 
microcredit (Van Rooyen et al., 2012).   
Barnes, Gaile and Kibombo (2001) assessed the impact of microcredit interventions in 
Uganda and found that while borrowers had a significantly higher likelihood of increasing net 
revenue, the general trend was that borrowers had reduced levels of net revenue (Barnes et al., 
2001: XV). Another study by Barnes and colleagues (Barnes, Keogh et al., 2001) assessed the 
impact of microlending interventions in Zimbabwe, and found that although borrowers 
demonstrated a reduced income two years after the initial assessment, after controlling for initial 
differences, there was no significant difference in this reduction of income from what non-
borrowers reported over the same time period.  Althoug  this suggests the overall economic 
climate in Zimbabwe likely attributed to the decline of income for both groups, borrowers did 




Gubert and Roubaud (2005) conducted an analysis of businesses receiving microcredit in 
Madagascar and found that although borrowers had higher incomes than non-borrowers at the 
end of the study, the difference was statistically non-significant.  The study period also covered a 
downturn in the economy during 2002.  The authors suggest, similar to Barnes, Keogh and 
Nemarundwe (2001), that credit did not insulate borrowers from the same negative economic 
outcomes non-borrowers experienced. 
Nanor (2008) assessed the impact of microcredit interventions in four districts of Eastern 
Ghana.  In this study, he demonstrated that microcredit improved income levels in two of the 
four districts.  However, his results also suggested that the longer a borrower remained a 
microcredit client the worse their business profit became (Nanor, 2008; Van Rooyen, et al., 
2012).  However, a longitudinal study conducted in Northern Ethiopia by Berhane and 
Gardebroek (2011) suggests the longer borrowers partici te in microloan programs the more 
likely they are to experience positive impacts on husehold consumption and make 
improvements to their homes. 
As demonstrated by this review of impact studies, microlending interventions have 
produced mixed results.  While these results may cause some to question the relationship 
between capital access and improved economic outcomes, another non-microlending study 
suggests the reasons microlending interventions are having little impact are likely the result of 
the structure of microloans rather than the underlying theory.  
De Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) conducted a field experiment in Sri Lanka 
where they provided grants to randomly selected small business owners to ascertain how 
productive they are with windfall infusions of cash, regardless of whether or not they apply for 




also not necessarily representative of the specific impacts of microlending, due to the structure 
and incentives microlending typically includes.  DeM l and colleagues (2008) found that the 
average return to capital in their randomly selected businesses was between 55 and 63 percent 
per year, which initially suggests that poor indiviuals in developing countries would be able to 
increase their incomes substantially if reasonably priced credit was available.  However, upon 
delving deeper into de Mel’s (2005) results, they dmonstrate that almost 60 percent of female 
business owners and just over 20 percent of male business owners had negative returns on 
capital.  This suggests the variance in returns to capital was quite large between businesses and 
that a large proportion of business owners were not meeting the minimum threshold of 
productivity to repay a loan with interest. 
These results beg the question of why the de Mel (2005) grant recipients had, on average, 
such a high return to capital while many microlending studies find a negligible impact on 
borrowers.  Microlenders have selection processes in place that should improve returns to capital 
rather than reduce them.  The low returns to capital achieved by microlenders when compared to 
the random recipients of the de Mel (2005) study suggest several possibilities such as: the 
screening device used by microlenders may prohibit ind viduals with the ability to attain high 
returns to capital from receiving loans, individuals with the ability to attain high returns may 
remove themselves from the applicant pool, the structu e of microloans inhibits a borrower’s 
ability to invest in high return activities, or some combination of these.   
In the following section, I review the literature on entrepreneurially-spurred economic 
growth, and in particular the literature on innovation, in order to provide a conceptual framework 
for how microlending may alleviate poverty.  Then using this framework, I put forth a model to 




to attain high returns from participating in microloans and/or inhibiting their ability to invest in 
high return activities. 
 
The Importance of Innovation 
 
A substantial body of research exists in the area of innovation, and examines such issues 
as the determinants of innovation (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Kirton, 1976), innovation’s effect on 
competitive advantage (McGrath, Tsai, Venkataraman & MacMillan, 1996), and innovation’s 
role in economic growth (Aghion et al., 1998; Schumpeter, 1934).  In spite of this vast amount of 
literature, little research has attempted to integrate innovation with microlending.  In the 
following section I outline some of the research on innovation to demonstrate its applicability 
and importance to the field of microlending. 
Neoclassical growth models predict convergence of per capita gross domestic product 
(GDP) between low-income countries and high-income countries due to the assumption of 
diminishing returns to capital investment (Aghion et al., 1998; Romer, 1994).  Essentially, low-
income countries will realize higher gains to investment than high-income countries which will 
ultimately result in their per capita GDP’s coming closer together.  However, data emerged in the 
late 1980’s and early 1990’s that was inconsistent with neoclassical growth models (Honohan, 
2004).  The per capita GDP of low-income countries wa  relatively stagnant in the period from 
1960-1985 while the per capita GDP of high-income countries continued to grow (Aghion, 
Howitt & Mayer-Foulkes, 2005; Heston & Summers, 199; Maddison, 1982).  This is indicative 
of divergence not convergence.  This resulted in some scholars questioning two basic 
assumptions of the neoclassical model: technological change is exogenous and the same 




1986, 1994).  The result of attempting to reconcile the emerging data and neoclassical models 
was a renewed interest in the importance of innovati n (Aghion & Howitt, 1998).   
Recent theories regarding the importance of innovati n to economic growth can attribute 
much of their origins to the writings of Joseph Schumpeter (1934).  In particular, Schumpeter 
speculated that entrepreneurs play a key role in eco omic growth by innovating new products or 
processes that are more productive than existing ones.  Entrepreneurs thus find more productive 
uses of resources that increase returns to capital invested and stimulate economic growth.   
There are two base assumptions of Schumpeter’s work (1934) as it relates to 
entrepreneurs: 1) the free market puts resources to their most efficient use; and 2) the 
entrepreneur is an innovator who develops new and more productive uses of resources.  
Specifically, people acting in their self-interest participate in the market by buying and selling 
items. Assuming no coercion, fraud, or other free market inhibitors, these market transactions 
divert resources from less productive uses to more productive uses as consumers attempt to 
purchase the highest value items for the lowest cost.  Entrepreneurs, acting in their own self-
interest, seek the potential of monopolistic rents stemming from the introduction of unique goods 
and services that create more value for consumers. 
Based on these assumptions, Schumpeter (1934) speculated that the entrepreneur plays a 
significant role in economic growth.  He suggested entrepreneurs create more market efficiency 
by recombining resources in a novel and more productive way that push less productive uses of 
resources from the marketplace.  Through the mechanism of a free market, entrepreneurs thus 
divert resources from old, obsolete, and less productive uses of resources to the new more 





Microlending advocates, such as Muhammad Yunus, have suggested that microlending 
will achieve its economic goal of poverty alleviation by promoting entrepreneurship (Yunus, 
2005).  Unfortunately, the common use of the term “entrepreneurship” often refers to small 
owner-operated businesses or the process of starting  business rather than Schumpeter’s 
definition of entrepreneurs as innovators.  An example of this is Birch (1979), which is the 
source most often cited in the management literature as empirical evidence that entrepreneurship 
is linked to economic growth. Birch demonstrated that a disproportionately greater number of 
new jobs are created by small businesses than by large businesses (Audretsch, 2005; Low & 
MacMillan, 1988; Shane, 1996).  However, Birch’s reearch measured the effects of small 
business, which is conceptually distinct from innovation (Carland, Hoy, Boulton & Carland, 
1984; Shane, 2009; Wong et al., 2005).  Entrepreneurs have been theoretically linked to 
economic growth due to their role as innovators, and not all small business owners are 
innovative.  Anecdotally supporting this distinction is Birch’s own research.  His research 
showed it was a small subsection of small business, as little as four percent, which accounted for 
nearly all of the small business job growth in his sample.   
What accounts for the difference between the job grwth created by this small subsection 
and the rest of the small businesses in Birch’s (1979) sample?  I suggest what Birch captured in 
this four percent were innovators.   An international study by Wong, Ho and Autio (2005) not 
only suggests small business ownership is conceptually distinct from innovation, but 
demonstrates that only innovation and high-growth potential entrepreneurship (a small sub-set of 
entrepreneurs that expect employment growth, market impact, a globalized customer base, and 




activity in general.  Again to emphasize the conceptual difference, innovators may start out as 
small businesses, but not all small businesses are innovators. 
Another common misconception is that start-ups, as a measure of entrepreneurship, is 
linked to economic growth.  However, start-ups are not inherently innovative either.  Shane 
(2009) stated, “The typical start-up is not innovative, creates few jobs, and generates little 
wealth” (pg 1).  Furthermore, researchers that have studied the impact of start-up activity on 
economic growth have shown that a high level of self-employment is associated with economic 
stagnation in developing countries (Acs & Varga, 2005; Autio & Yli-Renko, 1998).  This is the 
opposite relationship entrepreneurship is expected to have on economic growth and highlights a 
potentially stark difference between innovative entr preneurship and start-ups in developing 
countries.   
Not only are start-ups, small businesses, and innovators conceptually distinct, but their 
differing effects on economic growth have been empirically demonstrated (Acs et al., 2005; 
Autio et al., 1998; Wong et al., 2005).  It is important to note that, although the innovation 
literature has often focused on technological innovati n, or the efforts to push technological 
frontiers, (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996), not all innovations are necessarily of this type.  My 
conceptualization is that innovativeness represents a willingness to depart from the status quo 
(Kimberly & Evanisko, 1981).  Similar to Nord and Tucker (1987) and Klein and Sorra (1996), I 
define innovation as a technology or practice being used for the first time by an organization 
whether or not it has been previously used by other organizations.  This definition embraces the 
various ways in which a business may improve productivity and includes radical disruptive 




market innovation (Lumpkin et al., 1996) and efforts to differentiate end products or services in 
unique ways (Porter, 1990) among others.   
Although monopolistic rents are often cited as the motivation to create innovations 
(Grossman & Helpman, 1989; Romer, 1986), intellectual property rights are often incomplete 
which allows for the rent-free spread of productivity enhancing innovations to others (Aghion et 
al., 1998).  This suggests that businesses may utilize innovations developed elsewhere to 
improve their own productivity.  Knowledge spillovers are not costless propositions though.  
Scholars such as Aghion et al., (2005) and Cohen and Levinthal (1990) have suggested 
investment is necessary to understand, adapt, and utilize innovations.  Kirzner (1997) suggested 
there are informational asymmetries that allow certain individuals to act entrepreneurially by 
acting as brokers between those that “know” and those that “don’t know”.  Overcoming the 
ignorance of not knowing about innovations requires human capital investments to understand 
the potential implications of innovations as well as investments in search activities to find 
appropriate innovations to institute (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). 
Another aspect to consider is that innovations may be sold to businesses.  For instance, a 
new software program that allows companies to be more productive may be purchased for a 
price in the marketplace.  By purchasing appropriate software a company can adopt the software 
as an innovation, improve workplace productivity, and reap economic benefits.  This type of 
innovation adoption also requires investments of capital to search for, understand, purchase, and 
appropriately utilize the innovation. 
These theoretical developments can be summarized as follows: 1) Innovations represent 
more productive combinations of resources than previously existed; 2) Entrepreneurs seeking 




are openly sold in the market allow others to take dvantage of productivity enhancing 
innovations originally developed elsewhere; 4) Effectively adopting an innovation requires 
investments to understand, find and possibly purchase the innovation, as well as adapt, and 
utilize the innovation.  These items suggest one avenue for how microlending may enhance the 
welfare of the poor.  By providing capital, microlending institutions may provide the poor with 





Because innovation is difficult to measure, evidence of the importance of innovation to 
economic growth has largely been relegated to studies of productivity growth, which is largely 
assumed to be the outcome of successful innovation d ption (Aghion et al., 2005).  Studies have 
demonstrated that simple capital accumulation models, as suggested by early neoclassical growth 
models where capital is assumed to have a constant return, routinely underestimate productivity 
gains (Aghion et al., 1998).  Scholars have suggested this is due to the failure to account for 
innovations that increase the returns of capital investments and improve productivity growth 
(Aghion et al., 1998).  Studies by Easterly and Levin  (2001) and Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare 
(1997) suggest over 60 percent of the variation in growth rates of GDP per capita across 
countries is attributable to differences in productivity growth.  Given the continued divergence 
between developed and developing countries, this suggests that developed countries are able to 
routinely invest in innovations that improve productivity while developing countries are not 
(Aghion et al., 2005) 
However, Schumpeter’s writings and the empirical articles cited above have been 




and group level remains.  For this I turn to the work f Bradley et al. (2012b) where they find 
that the financial performance of microloan borrowers in Kenya was mediated by innovation.  
Specifically, they examined groups of borrowers andfound the ones that were more innovative 
in their business practices achieved higher financial performance than those borrowers that were 
not as innovative.  In another empirical study set in the Dominican Republic, Bradley et al. 
(2012a) found that increasing microcredit loan size had a positive effect on income level but only 
in the presence of business innovation.  These findings, when seen together with the macro level 
evidence of the importance of innovation, suggest a homologous multilevel model (Klein & 
Kozlowski, 2000) where innovation creates productivity increases that lead to increased incomes 
at the individual level and economic growth at the macro level. 
  
The Role of Banking 
 
Another theory that suggests how microlending may allevi te poverty, which also stems 
from the work of Schumpeter (1934), is that financil intermediaries, such as banks, may play an 
important role in economic growth.  Schumpeter speculated that banks improve the efficient use 
of capital by allocating it to the most productive projects.  By shifting capital away from 
unprofitable or low-profit businesses to highly profitable businesses, banks increase the returns 
to capital invested, raise the average productivity growth rate, and thereby stimulate economic 
growth.   
Agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) suggests the separation of principals and 
agents leads to potential conflicts of interest (see Dalton, Hitt, Certo & Dalton, 2007 or 
Eisenhardt, 1989 for a review).  In the context of lending, banks act as principals and borrowers 
as agents.  Borrowers may be dishonest regarding the intended uses of loan proceeds, the 




One way to overcome the information asymmetry and moral hazard inherent in most lending 
situations is to effectively monitor and prescreen the agents and banks offer some distinct 
advantages over individuals in this respect.  Evaluating potential entrepreneurs to ensure the 
capital is put to productive use requires large up-front information processing costs.  As 
specialists, banks acquire the ability to significantly lower these information processing costs 
(Acemoglu & Zilibotti, 1997; Aghion et al., 1998).  Additionally, banks are able to diversify the 
risk of investing in entrepreneurs over many different loans that individuals cannot achieve.  
These advantages allow banks to more efficiently divert funds to the most productive 
entrepreneurs at the expense of less productive ones, a d reduce overall risk through 
diversification (King et al., 1993b).  Consequently banks, in their own self-interest, improve 
productivity by rationing credit. 
 Multiple studies have demonstrated that financial depth, or the ratio of private credit to 
gross domestic product, is a robust predictor of ecnomic growth (Honohan, 2004; King & 
Levine 1993a, 1993b; Levine, Loayza & Beck, 2000).  This research demonstrates that financial 
depth predicted economic growth better than other pr viously used indicators, such as initial 
income level, government spending, inflation, and tra e openness.  Furthermore, King and 
Levine (1993b), and subsequently Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000), tested possible reverse 
causality of the relationship between financial depth and economic growth and determined 
financial depth preceded economic growth thereby negating the criticisms of possible 
endogeneity (Robinson, 1952; Lucas, 1988).   
However, it has been suggested that financial depth may disproportionately benefit the 
rich (Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1990).  Specifically, the rich may be in a better position to avail 




increase the incomes of the rich but not the poor, and thus financial depth may exacerbate 
income inequality.  Empirical evidence suggests that although the rich do benefit from increases 
in financial depth, the poor disproportionately benefit which reduces income inequality (Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt & Levine, 2007; Demirguc-Kunt & Levine, 2009).  Further support that 
financial depth benefits the poor can be found in indicators of poverty.  Children of impoverished 
families often have difficulties staying in school due to a need for them to work at an early age to 
help support their families.  Benhabib and Spiegel (2000) found that financial depth was 
associated with an increase in education rates among the poor.  Additionally, Dehejia and Gatti 
(2005) found that financial depth was associated with a reduction in child labor.  Cumulatively, 
this evidence suggests that increases in financial depth promotes economic growth and improves 
the lives of the poor. 
While it is possible for microlending to have the same effect as banks in increasing 
financial depth and improving economic growth, the tools used for reducing information 
asymmetry and evaluating prospective borrowers are ignificantly different between these 
institutions.  While banks typically require collateral, good credit scores, information about what 
the loan proceeds are going to be used for, and have specialists to evaluate this information 
microlending institutions rely on poor borrowers to perform this task through the process of 
inclusion and exclusion from borrowing groups.  Because group loan borrowers are often 
uneducated and lack experience in evaluating busines es, I suggest they are ill-equipped to 
determine the likelihood of success of other borrowers.  Evidence suggests they often use poor 
proxies such as marital status, number of relatives in the village, and prestigious positions held 
by family members (Coleman, 1999) when determining who receives a loan.  While these 




but decides not to, they are not likely to efficiently differentiate between highly productive 
activities and those that are less so. 
I suggest that if microlending is to be effective in creating economic growth it must foster 
innovation adoption, because the current structure that does not rely on specialists is not likely to 
achieve effective credit rationing that results in increasing productivity.  Furthermore, without 
innovation microlending may inadvertently be promoting the economic stagnation associated 
with high levels of self-employment in developing countries (Acs et al., 2005; Autio et al., 
1998). While there is little empirical evidence of how innovative the poor are in general, what 
cannot be disputed is that the poor continue to engage in low-value producing activities that 
subject them to a subsistence lifestyle in much of the world.  This suggests the poor are largely 
unable to adopt innovations that would increase their productivity, increase the value they create, 
and ultimately enable them to lift themselves out of poverty.   
  
Microlending and Risk 
 
 Poverty alleviation is one of the primary goals of microlending (Yunus, 2007), but what 
is meant by poverty?  The World Bank defines the “extremely poor” as those earning below 
$1.25 purchasing power parity (PPP) per day at 2005 prices (Chen & Ravallion, 2010).  While 
this $1.25 cutoff may seem rather arbitrary, $1.25 is based on significant amounts of research 
that suggest this level of income is necessary to ob ain the basic essentials of living such as 
minimal housing and a nutritionally adequate diet (Chen et al., 2010).  Pairing this definition of 
poverty with the statistics that suggest over 1.4 billion people are currently living below this 
threshold (Chen et al., 2010) reveals the conclusion that 20 per cent of the world’s population is 




 When living a subsistence lifestyle, risk of disea nd starvation are an ever present 
concern.  The poor in developing countries, where microlending has been most often targeted, 
often generate income through work consisting of farming and animal raising (Banerjee & Duflo, 
2007; Yesuf & Bluffstone, 2009).  This type of work carries many risks including variance in 
rainfall, crop diseases, and animal mortality.  Additionally, even if poor individuals are not 
involved in farming, they may become injured or fall ill which prevents them from generating an 
income.  Although in developed countries there are oft n many private and government 
sponsored assistance programs, access to these type of rograms are few and far between in 
developing countries.  Thus individuals in developing countries are often left to insure 
themselves against these types of calamities.  Evidence of the poor’s aversion to risk has been 
found in several studies.  Hamal and Anderson (1982) found that farmers in Nepal had very high 
levels of risk aversion that tend to decrease as wealth increases.  This suggests that wealth may 
serve as a buffer stock to smooth future consumption.     
Another related study by Dercon and Christiaensen (2011) explored the use of fertilizers 
in Ethiopia and discovered a similar risk aversion among poor farmers.  The Ethiopian 
government had undertaken a large campaign to increase the use of fertilizer by increasing its 
availability and training farmers in its use.  However, in spite of the government’s efforts, 
fertilizer use by farmers in Ethiopia is still only approximately 22% (Dercon et al., 2011).  The 
issue that is limiting the use of fertilizer appears not to be the availability or feasibility of using 
fertilizers but rather the desirability of using them.  Dercon et al. (2011) suggest that the 
uncertainty of returns to using fertilizers coupled with the decrease of surplus stocks, used to 
purchase the fertilizers, make the desirability of using fertilizers low.  To put it more simply, 




credit was used, to purchase fertilizers which increases the farmers’ dependence on a good 
harvest and reduces their ability to cope should the harvest fail.  Purchasing fertilizers thus not 
only represents the potential to increase profits, as touted by most advocates, but also increases 
the risk bearing of the farmers which has stymied its widespread use in Ethiopia. 
I suggest risk is an important aspect to consider when evaluating when and how 
innovations, such as fertilizers, are adopted in the developing world.  In the next section I begin 
developing an individual level model of innovation adoption, and I include perceived risk as an 
important motivator. 
 
III. THEORETICAL MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
 
Personality and Behavior 
 
 Entrepreneurship researchers have suggested that although individual characteristics may 
account for some of the variance of who engages in ntrepreneurship, “it is improbable that 
entrepreneurship can be explained solely by reference to a characteristic of certain people 
independent of the situations in which they find themselves” (emphasis in the original, Shane & 
Venkataraman, 2000: 218).  Similarly, innovation, which is oftentimes used synonymously with 
entrepreneurship (e.g. Schumpeter, 1934; Carland, Hoy, Carland, 1984), may be the result of an 
interaction between individual characteristics and the environment.  In order to understand how 
microlending may be affecting the adoption of innovations, I must begin by disentangling the 
characteristics of individuals and the aspects of microlending that may affect innovation 
adoption. 
Beginning with Kirton (1976) researchers have attempted to understand how to predict 




Along these lines, researchers have found supporting evidence that characteristics such as high 
levels of creativity increase an individual’s likelihood to create innovations (Kirton, 1976; 
Goldsmith, d’Hauteville & Flynn, 1997).  This leads me to my first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Borrowers with characteristics indicat ve of a proclivity to innovate 
are more likely to engage in innovative behavior than those 




However, understanding innovation adoption requires more than simply measuring an 
individual’s characteristics; “The complexity of human behavior and its determinants must be 
studied from a perspective that accounts for the simultaneous and interactive impact of 
individual differences and situational characteristics” (Meyer, Dalal & Hermida, 2010: 124).  To 
provide a framework for understanding the interaction of an individual’s proclivity to innovate 
with situational factors, I turn to Mischel’s (1977) concept of weak and strong situations. 
Mischel suggested that strong situations are ones in wh ch most actors draw similar 
conclusions about what is appropriate behavior, and thus act in a similar fashion.  In these 
situations, environmental cues are better predictors of behavior than individual characteristics 
and personality traits (Meyer et al., 2010).  For instance, a stop sign is an environmental cue that 
creates a strong situation where most, albeit not all, drivers stop in spite of their vast personality 
differences.  Alternatively, weak situations are ons in which the environmental cues are 
ambiguous about what behavior is appropriate (Mischel, 1977).  Continuing with the driving 
example, a weak situation may be illustrated with snowy driving conditions.  An individual with 




conditions, while an individual low in driving self-efficacy is more likely to wait for the driving 
conditions to improve.  In this situation there is no clear ‘right’ way to act and an individual’s 
predispositions are more likely to guide how they bhave rather than the environmental cues. 
The literature suggests situational factors, such as access to capital, may moderate the 
adoption of innovations (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 1999; Fishman and Simhon, 
2002; Patrick, 1966) and entrepreneurship (Kshetri, 2011).  Providing access to capital allows an 
individual with a high proclivity to innovate the opportunity to express that character trait.  Not 
only does capital availability allow an individual to purchase potential inputs for innovation, but 
it may also provide buffer stocks of resources to fall back on should the innovation fail.   
Microlending evolved from the assumption that the poor would seek out more productive 
activities, and thus innovate, if it weren’t for their capital constraints that prevent them from 
doing so (Bradley et al., 2012).  Providing access to capital, however, is not the only aspect of 
microlending that may affect the adoption of innovations.  I suggest that incremental loans and 
group-based lending are situational factors that may constrain the impact of an individual’s 
proclivity to innovate on innovative behavior.  As previously discussed, microlending 
institutions typically offer groups of borrowers small initial loan amounts. If all loans made to 
the group are paid in full, then the members are eligible for subsequent, larger loans (Khavul, 
2010). Additionally, borrowers are not allowed to have more than one outstanding loan with a 
microlender at a time.  There is evidence that those who have received microloans do, in fact, 
continue to take out new larger loans. In India, the average individual microloan debt has gone 
from $27 in 2004 to $135 in 2009, a fivefold increas  in just five years (Gokhale, 2009). Not 
only is there evidence that borrowers continue to take out larger loans, but there is also support 




qualitative study by Bruton, Khavul and Chavez (2011) showed that both individual borrowers 
and borrowing group leaders place an emphasis on mai taining access to future larger loans as a 
motivation for repayment. In their study, one borrower recounted how a group leader came to her 
when she was unable to pay and asked her if she wanted to be able to receive another loan in the 
future.  When a different borrower was asked what would happen if the group failed to make the 
loan payment, this borrower responded by saying that the lender “would stop giving loans” 
(Bruton et al., 2011, p.732).  These responses suggest borrowers value access to future loans. 
One reason borrowers may desire access to future loans is that they value the economic 
returns they can generate from profitably investing he proceeds. Losing access to future loans 
would then represent lost profits in the future.  I suggest a complementary reason borrowers in 
developing countries value access to future loans is that they may see access to credit as a type of 
insurance against idiosyncratic shocks.  For instance, if a crop fails or an individual gets sick or 
injured, a microloan may help the individual overcome a temporary loss in income and smooth 
their consumption over time (Amin et al., 2003).  Thus securing access to future loans may 
provide an individual an avenue to avoid a short-term catastrophe, and empirical evidence 
supports the role of microloans in income smoothing (Morduch, 1998; Pitt & Khandker, 1998).  
This second reason suggests that the poor investment of a microloan, that precludes repayment, 
represents not only the lost profits potentially generated by future loans, but also the loss of 
buffer resources that may insure an individual against the tragic consequences of idiosyncratic 
shocks in developing countries.  Therefore, individuals with high levels of intent to take out 
future loans are likely to prefer less risky uses of their current loan proceeds regardless of their 




However, if an individual borrower does not intend to take out a future loan the impetus 
to make a conservative investment in order to ensure repayment and maintain future eligibility is 
removed.  As such, individuals with low levels of intent to take out future loans are more likely 
to be guided by their innovative characteristics when deciding how to invest their current loan 
proceeds rather than the pressure to maintain future loan eligibility.   
Hypothesis 2: An individual’s intent to take out future loans moderates the 
relationship between their proclivity to innovate and innovation 
adoption such that at high levels of intent the relationship is weaker 
and at low levels of intent it has no effect.   
An additional consideration is whether or not borrowers have access to alternative 
sources of credit.  Alternative sources of credit reduce the borrower’s dependence on any 
particular source of credit, which would allow them to engage in higher risk higher reward 
investments without the fear of losing access to credit in the future.  Individuals that have 
multiple sources of credit are not as likely to perceive such strong situational cues and thus are 
more likely to allow their predispositions to determine how they invest loan proceeds. 
Hypothesis 3: The availability of alternative sources of credit strengthens the effect of an 
individual’s proclivity to innovate on innovation adoption. 
Group Lending 
 
Another aspect of the microlending context that needs to be considered is group lending.  
The most commonly used form of group lending includes individual loans with joint liability 
(Bhatt & Tang, 1998; Pelligrina, 2011).  In this scenario, individuals are provided loans, but if 
one borrower in their group defaults all members of the group are treated as defaulting.  Thus the 




elevated to a group level risk due to the shared fate of eligibility for future loans.  To put it 
another way, group lending creates a “weakest link” structure where the highest risk of failure of 
any individual becomes the group’s shared risk of failure.  Furthermore, the loans are individual 
and often invested in the borrower’s personal business.  This means that other members of the 
group do not have a claim on any of the profits resulting from a good investment of the loan 
proceeds.  Thus if an individual decides to take on a risky business opportunity only the risk of 
failure gets transferred to the other members and not the potential rewards.  For example, if a 
group has an individual that defaults, they are then left with the choice of two onerous actions: 1) 
Let the group default on the loan with the consequence of being unable to access future loans; or 
2) Make payments on the defaulter’s portion of the loan from their personal assets.  However, if 
a group has a member that makes a risky investment decision that pays off, the profits are not 
distributed to other group members.  I suggest that because the group is not compensated for the 
risks any individual may take, in the form of potential profits, but is penalized for risks that result 
in a default, the group has an incentive to reduce individual risk taking among group members.  
Innovation inherently requires trying something new, and is often considered risky.  Due to the 
incentives of group lending and the perceived risks of innovation I suggest innovation is less 
likely to occur in group loans than individual loans.  
Hypothesis 4: Innovation adoption will occur less frequently among group borrowers 
than individual borrowers. 
Group Socialization Model 
 
In the following section, I outline two potential mechanisms by which groups may reduce 
innovation adoption: sorting and social pressure.  The literature on groups and teams within the 




Kozlowski & Bell, 2003; Mathieu, Maynard, Rapp & Gilson, 2008).  However, within much of 
this literature the membership of the team or group is often taken as a given.  This stems from the 
belief that work groups are often assigned by managers and team members have little, if any, say 
in the team’s composition.  This arrangement differs quite considerably from microlending 
groups where membership is voluntary and mutually agreed upon. 
 One stream of literature that investigates the rolof self-selection in group dynamics is 
by Levine and Moreland (1982, 1985, 1988, 1990, 1994).  The group socialization model (GSM, 
Levine et al., 1994) primarily applies to small, voluntary, autonomous groups whose members 
interact on a regular basis and are behaviorally interdependent.  I believe this model is much 
more applicable to group lending than group or teamwork theories whose membership is 
assumed to not be voluntary. 
The GSM incorporates three psychological processes: evaluation, commitment, and role 
transition (Levine et al., 1994).  While I discuss evaluation and commitment in the context of 
microlending, role transition often includes ascending to other ranks within the group, such as 
moving from an entry level position to mid-level and senior positions (Levine et al., 1994) that is 
unlikely to occur in borrowing groups.  The relatively small number of members in many 
borrowing groups along with the flat hierarchical structure often precludes role transitions to mid 
and senior level positions by borrowers.  While role transitions also occur when members leave 
the group and investigating turnover among microloan borrowers may provide fruitful insight 
into the dynamics of group processes, with such theories as self-categorization theory (Hogg, 
1987) and identity theory (Stryker, 1968), this area of research is beyond the scope of this current 




Evaluation involves the efforts by the group and inividual members to assess and 
maximize the rewardingness of their relationship.  The GSM takes the assumption that every 
group has some goal or goals it wishes to accomplish (Levine et al., 1994).  Microlending 
groups, at a minimum, have the goal of meeting the requirements to receive a group-based loan.  
Additionally, I have suggested that group borrowers often have the secondary goal of 
maximizing the likelihood of being eligible for future loans (Bruton et al., 2011; Morduch, 
1999).  In terms of the GSM, this suggests individuals evaluate the rewardingness of being 
eligible for microloans prior to joining a borrowing group.  Furthermore, the group evaluates 
potential members and their ability to contribute to the group’s goals (Levine et al., 1994).  This 
two-way evaluation ends in group membership when an i dividual decides the rewardingness of 
being a member of the group is sufficient and the group decides the individual can sufficiently 
contribute to the attainment of group goals.  While consensus about potential members is not 
necessarily easily reached, “most groups develop informal or formal mechanisms for reaching 
consensus about individuals members” (Levine et al., 1994: p308).   
 Commitment, which depends on the outcome of the evaluation process, is based on the 
group’s and individual’s beliefs about the rewardingness of the relationship when compared to 
potential alternative relationships (Levine et al., 1994).  Acknowledging that initial loan proceeds 
are often received relatively contemporaneously with group formation, commitment to the 
borrowing group is thus likely determined by indiviual borrowers through an evaluation of the 
rewardingness of maintaining future access to loans, the likelihood of the group to maintain 
access to future loans, and the possible repercussions of withdrawing commitment to the group.  
Assuming that borrowers’ value future access to loans (Bruton et al., 2011; Gokhale, 2009), this 




to the group if alternative groups with a similarly low risk or even lower risk of default than the 
individual can be located.  Alternatively, individual borrowers with a higher risk of default than 
the group will likely have high commitment because maintaining membership in the group 
increases the likelihood of them achieving their goal.  Reciprocally, groups also evaluate 
commitment to individual members (Levine et al., 1994).  Groups with a higher risk of default 
than an individual borrower will likely have a high commitment to the individual due to their 
ability to contribute to the group goal of maintaining access to future loans, while groups with a 
lower risk of default than an individual member will likely have a low level of commitment to 
that individual.   
Supporting this notion are economic models that suggest a positive assortative matching 
process between potential borrowers whereby individuals with a similarly low or high risk of 
default form borrowing groups together rather than with individuals with dissimilar risk profiles 
(Armendariz de Aghion & Gollier, 2000; Ghatak, 2000; Van Tassel, 1999).  Positive assortative 
matching is based on the assumption that individuals within a community have relatively full 
knowledge of the riskiness of other members of the community (Ghatak, 2000).  Self-interested 
safe borrowers are thus able to form groups with other safe borrowers which lowers the risk of 
default, while risky borrowers are left to form groups with other risky borrowers.  Furthermore, 
empirical evidence suggests repayment rates are high r among borrowing groups that are able to 
actively engage in the screening of members (Wenner, 1995).  
I suggest exclusion will likely occur as a mechanism to reduce collective risk and 
inadvertently diminish the adoption of innovative business activities.  Exclusion will occur when 
a potential group member is perceived by the other members of the group to be 




1999; Ghatak, 1999).  The higher risk of this indivi ual increases the collective risk of default, 
and reduces the likelihood of the group attaining their group goal.  The other group members are 
thus incentivized to find a lower risk alternative to this individual who is more likely to 
positively contribute to goal attainment.  If a suitable alternative can be found, the high risk 
individual will be excluded from the group loan.  While exclusion has been empirically shown to 
reduce the overall group risk of default (Ghatak, 1999), I suggest it also reduces the adoption of 
innovative business practices due to their perception as uncertain and risky.  I suggest an 
individual that has previously attempted innovative activities, and thus likely has a relatively 
high proclivity to innovate, is likely to be perceiv d as risky and thus is more likely to be 
excluded by a borrowing group than individuals that engage in traditional activities that are 
perceived as ‘safe’.  
Hypothesis 5: Individuals with a high proclivity to innovate are less likely to 
participate in borrowing groups than others with a low proclivity to 
innovate. 
Another possible mechanism that would reduce the lev ls of innovation adoption among 
borrowing groups is innovative individuals may opt u of participating in group loans.  This 
differs from the mechanism of exclusion discussed above in that rather than borrowing groups 
deciding to exclude innovative individuals, the indivi uals themselves are opting not to 
participate in borrowing groups.  However, I suggest this is unlikely.  Group loans offer a 
significant, if not the only, source of reasonable cr dit available to many of the poor in 
developing countries.  Additionally, if innovative individuals feel that adopting an innovation 
would jeopardize their relationships with other group members they may simply elect to engage 




smoothing and insurance against idiosyncratic shock.  Moreover, if innovative individuals are 
aware of the riskiness of their business activities, they should seek to spread this risk by joining a 
borrowing group.    
GSM also suggests behavioral expectations, or norms, are created for how goals are to be 
accomplished and each individual’s behavior is compared to these norms (Levine et al., 1994).  
If there is a discrepancy between group norms and an individual’s behavior corrective action 
may be taken by the group such as social isolation or expulsion.  This type of response may be 
considered a “tit for tat” type behavior wherein the individual’s nonconformist behavior impedes 
the group’s ability to achieve their goal and the notion of reciprocity, and in particular negative 
reciprocity (Fehr & Gachter, 2000), dictate an in-kd response.  In the context of microlending, 
the potential enforcement of social sanctions against individuals that default is one often cited 
reason for the high repayment rates observed (Morduch, 1999).  A study conducted by Wydick 
(1999) in Guatemala suggests peer monitoring, or the ability of group members to assess 
individual member actions, is the most important aspect of group lending in determining loan 
repayment rates.  Individual members that perform behaviors consistent with group norms but 
that suffer hardship, which precludes them from repaying their loan, are often insured by other 
group members, while individuals that do not adequately perform behaviors consistent with 
group norms are expelled from the group (Wydick, 1999).  Moreover, it has been suggested the 
social isolation that occurs as a result of default carries over from the microlending context to 
other economic and social functions within the community such as the loss of reputation and 





I suggest that not only are negative group responses lik ly to occur when an individual 
defaults, but also when an individual is perceived to be increasing the risk of default.  If an 
individual joins a borrowing group, accepts the loan and then is observed by the group to be 
using the loan proceeds for what is perceived to be a risky activity, I suggest they will often be 
pressured by the group to choose a less risky altern tive that decreases the likelihood of default.  
Bruton et al. (2011), based on their qualitative data collected in Guatemala and the Dominican 
Republic, observed that some borrowers actively manage relationships within their borrowing 
groups.  Furthermore, given that peer monitoring is an important part of the group lending 
process (Wydick, 1999), it appears highly unlikely that groups would simply wait to take action 
until an actual default occurs.   
I suggest that because innovative business activities are likely perceived to have uncertain 
returns, and thus be risky, a borrowing group may see an individual member engaging in 
innovative activities as increasing the group’s risk of default for personal gain. Moreover, 
because increasing the group’s risk of default is likely antithetical to the group’s goal of 
maintaining future access to loans (Bruton et al., 2011; Gokhale, 2009) this type of behavior 
would constitute a violation of group norms that according to the GSM (Levine et al., 1994) 
dictates corrective action be taken.  I suggest that cues from other group members regarding 
potential social sanctions if risky activities are undertaken likely create a strong situation that 
decreases the likelihood an individual will express a proclivity to innovate by adopting an 
innovation.   
Hypothesis 6: Loan type (group or individual) moderat s the relationship between a 




relationship between personality traits and innovati e behavior is weaker in 





One of the first steps in conducting an empirical study is defining the population to be 
sampled.  While the ideal population for this study would be all borrowers from microlending 
institutions worldwide, obviously this is not feasible, so the population was narrowed to 
microlending borrowers within Ethiopia.  However, again this sample is unfeasible given the 
geographic dispersion of borrowers throughout Ethiopia, where communication and travel are 
difficult at best due to poor infrastructure and often illiterate borrowers.  As a result, this study 
began with microfinance institutions with an office located in the capital city of Addis Ababa.   
At the time of the study, there were 30 microfinance institutions officially operating in 
Ethiopia.  Of these, 11 have offices located in Addis Ababa and have more than 10,000 
borrowers.  Five of these microfinance institutions were asked to participate in the study and 
three agreed.  With the help of managers and officers from each participating microfinance 
organization, 11 branches located within a four hour drive of Addis Ababa were purposefully 
selected to balance the competing interests of gathering a large and diverse sample with logistical 
limitations.   
While the sample would ordinarily be compared to the population to establish the threat 
of any potential selection bias, this type of comparison is particularly difficult among microloan 
borrowers in Ethiopia.  Not only is basic demographic information on borrowers not publicly 
available, but many microfinance organizations do not even capture this type of information 




possess different characteristics than the population s a whole.  The selection bias issue covered 
previously in the review of microlending impact studies is indicative of this fact.  Additionally, 
microloan borrowers are typically poor, but not thepoorest in a community (Amin, Rai & Topa, 
2003).  These facts suggest comparing a sample of microloan borrowers to the general 
population of a geographic area is also inadequate.  Because the potential of selection bias cannot 
be ruled out the results of this study cannot be generalized to any larger population with 
certainty.  However, because care was taken to sample from three different types of microlending 
institutions and multiple branch locations were surveyed, I believe the concern of selection bias 
was minimized to the extent possible given the limited resources and data available. 
In order to test the proposed hypotheses, data was gathered using semi-structured 
interviews with 340 microloan borrowers in Ethiopia.  The interviews lasted between 30 minutes 
and one hour and were conducted over a three week period in the summer of 2013.  Most 
borrowers were interviewed at the microfinance organiz tion’s branch office as they came to 
make a payment on their loan.  However, when there w r  an insufficient number of borrowers 
coming to make payments at the branch office, interviewers went to a borrower’s business, 
home, or place of work to conduct the interview.   
Ten interviewers were recruited from Master’s level programs at Addis Ababa University 
who were fluent in English and Amharic.  Prior to conducting the interviews, the interviewers 
went through a two hour training session where proper interview techniques were discussed.  An 
Amharic translation of the questionnaire was created, and the interview questions were discussed 
among the interviewers and lead researcher to ensur the interviewers understood each question.  
Interviewers were provided a questionnaire for each interview where they could record the 




additional translation was necessary.  This was accomplished through two interviewers that 
spoke some Oromo and three employees of the microlending institutions that were fluent in 
Amharic and Oromo. 
The sample’s average household size was 4.5 with an income between 251-500 birr per 
week ($13.45-$26.88).  Approximately 54% of the respondents were female.  The median total 
savings for the sample was 1,200 birr (approximately $95) while the mean was 5,707 birr 
(approximately $307).  This demonstrates significant positive skew due to a handful of 
individuals with a relatively large amount of savings (skewness 7.099).  The sample also 
consisted of 113 borrowers of individual loans and 227 borrowers of group loans. 
The first institution is very large and backed by the Ethiopian government.  This 
organization offers loans in various sizes from 700birr (approximately $37.50) up to 350,000 
birr (approximately $18,800).  The loans are packaged into different loan products such as micro 
loans (700-5,000 birr or approximately $37.63-$269), small loans (5,000-250,000 birr or 
approximately $269-$13,441), agricultural loans (700-250,000 birr or approximately $37.63-
$13,441), and housing loans (700-350,000 birr or app oximately $37.50-$18,800) that each have 
different loan repayment schedules.  Additionally, each loan offered by this organization requires 
a payment of 1-2 percent of the loan value to purchase insurance benefiting the microfinance 
institution in the event the borrower passes away prior to repaying the loan.  Loans are made in 
both a non-collateralized group lending and a collateralized individual loan format.  Acceptable 
collateral for individual loans include land, pledgd wages from a recognized employer (often 
the government), or evidence of regular long-term income from business interests.  Interest rates 
range from 15 to 19 percent depending on the loan product and repayment schedule.  150 of the 




average household size of 4.13 with an income between 251-500 birr per week ($13.45-$26.88).  
Approximately 45% of the respondents from this institution were female. 
 The second microfinance organization is affiliated with a large international non-
governmental organization (NGO).  This organization offers agricultural loans, agribusiness 
loans, business loans, and family loans and uses a lending methodology of either individual 
loans, solidarity loans (3-9 members), and community banking loans (10-35 members).  Interest 
rates range from 15 percent for business loans to 19 percent for family loans and 24 percent for 
agricultural loans.  Additionally, all borrowers must pay 2.5 percent of the loan value for an 
insurance policy benefiting the microlender in case of the death of the borrower.  Group loans 
(solidarity and community) require deposits amounting o 10 percent of the loan value.  
Individual loans below 7,000 birr ($376) require pldging salary as collateral, while above 7,000 
birr fixed assets such as a house or car must be pledged as collateral.  118 of the 340 interviews 
were conducted with borrowers of this institution.  These borrowers had an average household 
size of 4.95 with an income between 251-500 birr pe week ($13.45-$26.88).  Approximately 
57% of the respondents from this institution were female. 
 The third microfinance organization is privately owned and not affiliated with the 
government or an NGO. This organization offers uncollateralized group loans between 2,000 birr 
and 10,000 birr (approximately $108 to $538) and individual collateralized loans up to 30,000 
birr ($1,613).  All loans have a 12 month repayment period and have interest rates between 15 
and 20 percent.  72 of the 340 interviews were conducted with borrowers of this institution.  
These borrowers had an average household size of 4.36 with an income between 0-251 birr per 




 While there are significant differences in the borrower characteristics of each 
microlending institution, these differences were expected given the demographic characteristics 
of the locations served by each institution, and each institution’s respective emphasis on 
sustainability, outreach, or social impact.  The large government backed microlender emphasizes 
growing the number of borrowers in a cost-effective manner, while maintaining high repayment 
rates.  This is indicated by their largely urban branch locations and the metrics they gather to 
determine loan officer/branch success.  The microlender affiliated with an international NGO 
emphasizes sustainability and outreach.  This is indicated by their urban and rural locations, the 
wide range of products offered (for both the poor and relatively rich), and the metrics they gather 
on each borrower.  The privately held microlender emphasizes social impact, which is indicated 
by their placement of branch offices in very poor semi-urban locations and the recruitment of 
women as borrowers.  Early studies suggested loans t  women had a higher social impact 
because women were more likely to invest in their homes and children than men were (Morduch, 






Innovation adoption, which has been suggested to bean important determinant in 
increasing individual incomes (Bradley et al., 2012a, 012b) and economic growth (Aghion et 
al., 2005), was determined by using an adapted three item index from Dahlqvist/Wiklund’s 
market newness index (2012).  This index seeks to determine how innovative businesses are 
using self-report measures by probing whether respondents perceive their businesses to be 
offering new products, using new processes to create their products, and/or new methods of 




for each category.  Individual scores are then aggregated and may range from 0 (no different 
methods) to 15 (very different methods in each category).  For example, a borrower selling injera 
(a bread product that is a staple in the Ethiopian d et), would not likely consider it a new product, 
and thus have a low score on that component.  However, if this same borrower was using a gas 
stove and delivering their product to hotels while th ir competitors were using charcoal and 
selling it in the marketplace, they may score highly on the components of innovative processes 
and distribution methods.   
In addition to these questions, borrowers were asked if they had changed anything about 
the way in which they earn an income in the past year in order to capture the possibility that the 
microloan was used to bring them up to the current innovation standard rather than allowing 




This study is intended to explore how the structure of microlending may impact 
innovation adoption.  As such, I deemed it important o begin with a framework that recognized 
individual differences in order to distinguish betwen the sorting effect exclusion might create 
from the inhibitive effects social pressure might create.   
The Kirton Adaptor-Innovator Inventory (KAI) seeks to measure an individual’s 
likelihood to adapt or innovate by determining their trait creativity, a characteristic demonstrated 
to positively correlate with innovative behavior (Kirton, 1976; Miron, Erez & Naveh, 2004).  
This instrument includes questions such as “Do you have a lot of creative ideas?”  Three items 
from this scale were used in the current study. 
One concern of using a personality measure, such as the KAI, is whether it remains 




innovative behavior has been used in East Africa, the KAI has been validated as a reliable 
indicator of an innovative personality in the U.S., U K., Italy, France, Slovakia, and the 
Netherlands (Tullett & Kirton, 1995).  While far from conclusive, these cross cultural 
examinations of the KAI provide some indication of its usefulness beyond the culture and 




Group lending and incremental loans have been suggeted to be important parts of how 
microlending has reduced default rates (Morduch, 1999).  This study seeks to understand how 
these parts of microlending may also impact innovati n adoption among borrowers.  To 
determine whether borrowers were a part of a group l an or individual loan, a question of what 
type of loan they have was directly asked to the borrower in addition to the names of group 
members (if applicable).  Confirmatory evidence was g thered from loan officers about the type 
of loan borrowers received when possible.  To determine the potential impact incremental loans 
might have, the perceived value of future loans wasgathered by asking borrowers how likely 
they are to take loans in the future, and if likely, how soon after repaying the current loan they 
would like to take another loan.  Additionally, in order to determine the impact alternative 
sources of credit may have on innovation adoption brrowers were asked if they have access to 




In addition to the variables mentioned above, the literature has suggested other items that 
may affect the likelihood of innovation adoption.  Specifically, the number of dependents in a 




influence risk preferences that may reduce the likelihood of adopting an innovation (Al-Azzam, 
et al., 2012; Bradley, Artz, et al., 2012; Coleman, 2006; Dercon et al., 2011).  Specifically, the 
larger the number of dependents the more risk averse a borrower is likely to be with regard to 
future income.  Alternatively, higher household wealth, higher borrower income, and higher 
household income may provide buffer resources that allow borrowers to be more risk neutral or 
even risk seeking with regard to future income. 
The number of dependents was determined by asking how many household members 
there are and whether or not they were currently working.  It is assumed that all members of the 
household not currently working are dependents.   
Household wealth was determined by asking a series of questions regarding the amount 
of current household savings and durable goods owned by a borrower (e.g. metal roof, concrete 
floors, mobile phone).  Factor reduction was used with the answers to the durable goods 
questions to arrive at a factor score for each borrowe .  This factor score was found to be 
significantly correlated with household savings (p < .001) and proved to have no significant 
explanatory power above and beyond household savings.  As such, it was dropped from the 
analyses. 
Borrower and household income were determined by asking whether working members 
of the household made between 0-250 ($0-$13.44), 251-500 ($13.45-$26.88), 501-1000 ($26.89-
$53.76), 1001-1500 ($53.77-$80.65), or over 1500 birr in the last week.  The income ranges of 
each household worker were then aggregated to arrive at an approximate household income.  
Additionally, average household worker income was assessed to take into account the 
distribution of household income across the number of household workers.  For instance, there 




week with two dependents and a household with all three household members earning between 
251-500 birr per week.  In the case of farmers who may have difficulty determining weekly 
income, questions regarding last year’s harvest were posed to determine a yearly income that 
will then be divided by 52 to make it comparable to o her responses.   
Aggregate household income proved to be non-significant in the analyses and was 
therefore dropped.  Average household worker income was significant in several analyses; 
however, it is highly correlated with borrower income (β = .945; p < .001) and was dropped due 
to concerns about multicollinearity. 
V. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
 This chapter reports the results of testing the hypothesized relationships.  The descriptive 
statistics and correlations are reported first, followed by the results of a confirmatory factor 
analysis, and finally, the results of testing each hypothesized relationship are presented.   
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
 The means, standard deviations, and correlations for all variables are reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 - Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations 
  Mean Std. Deviation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Wealth  Br 5,706.92   Br 19,025.35  1 -.231**  .230**  .139* .196**  .014 .184* 
Dependents 2.116 1.706 -.231**  1 -.067 .002 -.117* -.046 -.096 
Income 2.228 1.173 .230**  -.067 1 -.017 .178**  -.091 .095 
KAI 7.444 1.446 .139* .002 -.017 1 .130* -.030 -.100 
Innovation 9.113 2.667 .196**  -.117* .178**  .130* 1 .072 .041 
Future Loan 
Likelihood 
4.341 2.219 .014 -.046 -.091 -.030 .072 1 -.021 
Alt. Sources 1.168 0.375 .184* -.096 .095 -.100 .041 -.021 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 




Instrument Evaluation and Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
 
The first step in analyzing the data is ensuring the sample size is large enough relative to 
the number of variables to detect a stable factor structure (Ferguson & Cox, 1993).  
Recommendations range between 2:1 and 10:1 for an acceptable subject-to-variable ratio (van 
Dierendonck & Nuijten, 2011).  In this study my sample includes a total of 340 participants and 
10 variables of interest providing a ratio of 34:1.  Therefore, the sample in this study exceeds the 
threshold to determine a stable factor structure and variable relationships. 
The next step is to determine the normality of the i ems by checking their skewness and 
kurtosis.  Following Ferguson and Cox (1993), I determined whether the items exceeded ±2.0.  
No items except borrower wealth exceeded this threshold for skewness or kurtosis.  The data of 
each variable was also analyzed for normality using the Shapiro-Wilkes method.  Following this 
analysis, transformations of the following variables were conducted to improve the indicators of 
normality: log of borrower income and borrower wealth. 
I then applied the Kaiser-Mayer-Olkin test and the Bartlett’s test of sphericity to the KAI 
to ensure the correlation matrix was appropriate to produce a factor structure not found by 
chance and homogeneity of variance.  The Kaiser-Mayer-Olkin test was .647, which exceeds the 
required minimum value of .5 (van Dierendonck et al., 2011).  Additionally, the Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity was significant (130.243, df = 3, p < .001), suggesting the assumption of homogeneity 
of variance is supported. 
Next, to determine the construct and discriminant validity of the KAI instrument, a 
confirmatory factor analysis was conducted.  Included in the factor analysis was Goldsmith and 
Hofacker’s (1991) innovativeness index scale.  This instrument was developed to determine the 




to, but narrower, than the KAI (Goldsmith & Foxall, 2003).  Results of the factor analysis 
suggest the KAI and innovativeness index scale load on to two distinct factors that are 
significantly correlated with each other (β = .173, p < .01).  Item 3 of the KAI was dropped due 
to its very low loading (.327).  The factor analysis was run a second time without item 3 of the 
KAI, and produced a very clean two factor solution (see Table 2) 
Table 2 - Factor Analysis 
  Component 
  1 2 
KAI - 1 -.037 .855 
KAI - 2 .063 .822 
Gold - 1 .725 -.172 
Gold - 2 .746 .044 
Gold - 3 .658 .078 
Gold - 4 .785 .091 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations. 
The reliability of the KAI instrument was then assed using three different methods as 
suggested by Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, and Tatham (2010).  The first method is to assess 
the item-to-total correlation and inter item correlations.  The suggested minimum threshold for 
item-to-total correlation is .5 and .3 for inter item correlations.  The item-to-total correlation for 
both items of the KAI in my sample exceed .782.  Additionally, the inter item correlation is .437.  
Thus the items of the KAI exceed the minimum threshold for internal consistency using this 
method. 
The second method for determining reliability is to use Cronbach’s alpha.  Using all three 
items of the KAI produced an alpha of .144, however, as mentioned previously, the third item of 
the KAI produced very low factor loadings.  Using a two scale index, where the third item was 




.70.  However, Cronbach’s alpha has been demonstrated to underestimate reliability ratings when 
there are few items in the scale (Hair et al., 2010).  Regardless, the KAI items do not exceed the 
minimum threshold for internal reliability as suggested by Cronbach’s alpha. 
The third method for assessing reliability is to determine the item factor loadings in a 
confirmatory factor analysis.  While it has been suggested that loadings between .6 and .7 may 
be acceptable, the generally accepted threshold is that items should exceed .7 (Hair et al., 2010).  
Both KAI items in my study exceed .8 (See Table 2), which demonstrates acceptable reliability.  
Given that the KAI exceeds the thresholds of two of the three methods used to determine 
reliability, and Cronbach’s alpha has been demonstrated to underestimate reliability among 
scales with few items, I have determined that the KAI meets the minimum threshold of reliability 
to be utilized in this study. 
Hypothesis 1 
 
A hierarchical regression model was developed to test hypothesis 1, which suggested 
higher innovation scores on the KAI are correlated with innovative behavior.  Model 1 included 
only the control variables of number of dependents, wealth, and borrower income.  Model 2 
introduced the personality measures of the KAI (Table 3). 
The results provided in Table 3 suggest Kirton’s KAI is a significant predictor of 
innovation adoption among microloan borrowers (β = .135, p = .05).  This provides support for 
the main effect that the KAI personality measure prdicts innovative behavior, and suggests the 





Table 3 - Hypothesis 1 
Dependent Variable   Model 1: Model 2: 
Innovative Behavior   Control KAI 
Wealth .188** .162* 
Dependents -.023 -.024 
Borrower Income  .211** .204** 
KAI .135*  
Model R² .100 .117 
Adjusted R² .086 .099 
Model F 7.225** 6.454** 
∆ R² .100 .017 
F for ∆ R²     7.225** 3.828* 
n = 200 
* = .05 
** = .01 
     
Hypothesis 2 
 
To determine whether incremental loans may have a moderating impact on the 
relationship between personality and behavior another hierarchical regression was run (Table 4).  
Model 1 included only the control variables.  Model 2 includes the KAI and borrower intent to 
take a future loan.  Model 3 includes the multiplicative term of the KAI and borrower intent to 
take a future loan. 
Hypothesis 2 suggested borrower intent to take a future loan would moderate the 
relationship between the KAI and innovative behavior.  The results of Table 4 suggest intent of a 
borrower to take a future loan is not significant as a main effect in predicting innovative behavior 
when added to Model 2 with the KAI (p=.201).  In Model 3 there is also no support for a 







Table 4 - Hypothesis 2 
Dependent Variable   Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: 
Innovative Behavior   Control Main Interaction 
Wealth .188** .160* .161* 
Dependents -.023 -.018 -.020 
Borrower Income .211** .218** .217** 
KAI .134* .136* 
Future Loan .087 .87 
KAI x Future Loan .019 
Model R² .100 .124 .125 
Adjusted R² .086 .102 .097 
Model F 7.225** 5.509** 4.582** 
∆ R² .100 .025 .000 
F for ∆ R²    7.225** 2.742 .076 
n = 200 
* = .05 




To test the potential of a moderation effect between th  personality measures and 
alternative sources of credit as proposed in Hypothesis 3, hierarchical regressions were 
performed where Model 1 includes the control variables, Model 2 includes the main effect 
variables, and Model 3 introduces the interaction term.  The results are reported in Table 5. 
Hypothesis 3 proposed a moderation effect of access to alternative sources of credit 
between the KAI and innovative behavior.  This hypothesis was tested by creating an interaction 
term with these two variables.  The results of the hierarchical regression from Table 5 were not 








Table 5 - Hypothesis 3 
Dependent Variable   Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: 
Innovative Behavior   Control Main Interaction 
Wealth .130 .134 .135 
Dependents -.008 -.017 -.017 
Borrower Income .233** .240** .240** 
KAI .079 -.008 
Loan Access -.090 -.085 
KAI x Loan Access .091 
Model R² .085 .101 .101 
Adjusted R² .067 .071 .065 
Model F 4.688** 3.355* 2.795* 
∆ R² .085 .016 .001 
F for ∆ R²     4.688** 1.325 .096 
n = 156 
* = .05 




To test whether innovation occurs less frequently among borrowers taking group loans 
than borrowers taking individual loans (Hypothesis 4), a one-way ANOVA was conducted to 
compare the means of the innovative behavior measurs between between loan types.  The 
results are reported in Table 6.  
Hypothesis 4 suggested innovation levels are lower among group loan borrowers than 
individual loan borrowers.  A one-way ANOVA (reported in Table 6) was conducted to test this 
hypothesis.  The results suggests borrowers taking individual loans (mean 9.58) are significantly 
more likely to engage in innovative behavior than borrowers taking group loans (mean 8.89), 






Table 6 - Hypothesis 4 
Dependent Variable   Sum of df Mean F Significance 
Innovative Behavior   Squares   Square     
Between Groups 33.232 1 33.232 4.727 0.030 
Within Groups 228.706 317 7.031 




To test whether a sorting effect was present (Hypothesis 5), a one-way ANOVA was 
conducted to compare the means of the personality measures between loan types.  The results are 
reported in Table 7.  
Hypothesis 5 suggested one mechanism that may be contributing to the significant 
difference in innovative behavior between individual lo n borrowers and group loan borrowers is 
a sorting effect.  Specifically, I suggested indiviuals with higher scores on the KAI may be 
excluded from group loans.  A one-way ANOVA (reported in Table 7) was conducted to test this 
hypothesis, and suggests individuals with a higher proclivity to innovate are more likely to be 
found taking individual loans (mean 7.64) than group loans (mean 7.35).   The difference in 
means is statistically significant at the .1 level, F(1, 332) 2.910, p = .089.  This result is 
consistent with a weak sorting effect with regard to loan type on measures of the KAI.  Therefore 
hypothesis 4 is marginally supported. 
Table 7 - Hypothesis 5 
Dependent Variable   Sum of df Mean F Significance 
KAI   Squares   Square     
Between Groups 6.050 1 6.050 2.910 .089 
Within Groups 688.172 331 2.079 







To test hypothesis 6, which suggested loan type moderates the relationship between 
personality and behavior, another hierarchical regression (Table 8) was run that included an 
interaction term created by multiplying loan type and the KAI.  Model 1 included the control 
variables.  Model 2 included loan type and the KAI, and Model 3 included the interaction term.  
To further explore the moderating effect, the data was split based on loan type.  A hierarchical 
regression was then run on both the individual borrower and group borrower subsamples (Table 
9).  Model 1 again includes the control variables and model 2 introduces the KAI.     
Table 8 - Hypothesis 6
Dependent Variable   Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: 
Innovative Behavior   Control Main Interaction 
Wealth .188** .156* .150* 
Dependents -.023 -.021 -.046 
Borrower Income .211** .203** .211** 
KAI .133 .804** 
Loan Type -.019 .018 
KAI x Loan Type -.688* 
Model R² .100 .117 .147 
Adjusted R² .086 .094 .120 
Model F 7.225** 5.153** 5.523** 
∆ R² .100 .018 .029 
F for ∆ R²    7.225** 1.940 6.628* 
n = 200 
* = .05 
** = .01 
 
Hypothesis 6 suggested loan type would have a moderating effect on the relationship 
between personality and innovative behavior.  The results provided in Table 8 suggest a 
moderating effect of loan type with the KAI personality measure in predicting innovative 




according to loan type and hierarchical regressions were run with each subsample (Table 9).  The 
results support Hypothesis 6 in that loan type creates  moderating effect where the KAI predicts 
innovative behavior in individual loans (p=.009) but not group loans (p=.796).  This finding is 
consistent with the assertion that group loans create a strong situation where individual 
differences are overwhelmed by environmental cues.  Specifically, an individual’s personality 
significantly predicts innovative behavior in individuals’ loans, but not in group loans where I 
suggested group pressure creates a strong situational cue to be risk averse. 
To further explore whether a social pressure effect may have an effect on innovation 
levels between group loans and individual loans beyond the sorting effect previously discuss, the 
innovative behavior means of group loan borrowers and individual borrowers were compared 
while controlling for KAI mean differences between loan types.  The results of the ANCOVA 
reported in Table 10 suggest individual borrowers are significantly more likely to engage in 
innovative behavior than group loan borrowers after controlling for personality differences 
F(1,309) 3.585, p=.011.  This result is consistent with the notion that group loans suppress 





Table 9 - Hypothesis 6 
Dependent Variable     Model 1:Model 2: 
Innovative Behavior     Control KAI 
Individual Loan 
Wealth .261 .200 
Dependents .285* .213* 
Borrower Income .128 .161 
KAI .319** 
Model R² .206 .299 
Adjusted R² .165 .249 
Model F 4.941** 5.985** 
∆ R² .206 .093 
F for ∆ R²   4.941** 7.440** 
n = 61 
Group Loan 
Wealth .105 .101 
Dependents -.149 -.148 
Borrower Income .214** .212* 
KAI .022 
Model R² .094 .095 
Adjusted R² .074 .068 
Model F 4.678** 3.501** 
∆ R² .094 .000 
F for ∆ R²   4.678** .067 
n = 139 
* = .05 
** = .01 
 
To determine whether there was a significant difference in the average rates of innovation 
adoption between group loan and individual loan borrowers beyond any potential sorting effect, 
an ANCOVA was conducted that controlled for personality scores on the KAI.  Levene’s test of 
equality of error variances was conducted to ensure the assumption of homogeneity of variance 
held for the KAI scores between groups.  The assumption of homogeneity of variance was 






Dependent Variable   Sum of df Mean F Significance 
Innovative Behavior   Squares   Square     
Corrected Model 62.681 2 31.340 4.495 .028 
Intercept 635.902 1 635.902 91.204 .228 
KAI 31.312 1 31.312 4.491 .014 
Loan Type 24.994 1 24.994 3.585 .011 
Error 2154.434 309 6.972 
Total 28032.000 312 7.031 




The fundamental goal of many microlending institutions is to improve the lives of the 
poor (Yunus, 2007; Khavul, 2010).  Yet, recent studies suggest microlending is falling short of 
this goal (Coleman, 1999; Karlan et al., 2011). One key challenge to the development of the 
literature on microlending and improving its impact is understanding the mechanisms by which 
lending to the poor may achieve this goal.   
Although researchers have suggested various reasons for why microlending should 
improve the lives of the poor such as promoting entrepreneurship or that access to credit is a de 
facto benefit for the poor, few have rigorously tested these theories.  I have suggested that 
encouraging innovative behavior is one empirically supported avenue by which microlending 
may improve the lives of the poor.  By providing credit, microlenders may offer borrowers the 
capital necessary to invest in new more productive business activities.  However, I have also 
suggested that the structure of microloans that has led to improved repayment rates may also be 
inhibiting investment in innovative activities.  This study provides a first step toward 




decisions.  These investment decisions are what will ultimately determine whether microlending 
is effective in alleviating poverty or creating a cycle of debt.   
The results of this study suggest group loans may have a negative effect on innovative 
behavior.  In this sample, group loan borrowers are significantly less likely to engage in 
innovative behaviors than individual borrowers.  This study also suggests there may be two 
causes for the difference in innovative behavior betwe n loan types: a sorting effect and social 
pressure.  Innovative individuals are less likely to partake in group loans than less-innovative 
individuals.  This suggests that either group borrowers may be excluding innovative individuals 
from their borrowing groups or innovative individuals may be self-selecting out of participating 
in group loans.   
Innovative individuals that are in group loans also appear to be pressured to not engage in 
innovative behavior as evidenced by the fact that an innovative personality is significantly 
related to a borrower’s innovative behavior in indivi ual loans but not group loans.  The results 
of this study also suggest that, after controlling for differences in innovative personalities, group 
loans appear to significantly suppress innovative behavior.  This result provides further support 
for the premise that group loans create pressure on individuals to not behave innovatively. 
 In spite of these results there are several ways microlenders may be able to improve 
innovative behavior and the productivity of their borrowers.  For instance, specific purpose loans 
are offered to the poor for the purchase of predefined business items.  In Ethiopia specific 
purpose loans have been offered to farmers for the purchase of fertilizer (Dercon et al., 2011) and 
tools and equipment for recently graduated tradesman (ADCSI, 2013, personal correspondence).  
Additionally, in Kenya Yehu Microfinance provides loans specifically for the purpose of chicken 




Although, specific purpose loans reduce the ability of the borrower to be creative with the 
use of the loan proceeds, and thus may artificially cap productivity gains, because specific 
purpose loans are provided to individuals new to that ype of business, in the case of chicken and 
goat farming loans, or specifically for productivity-enhancing investments, in the case of 
fertilizers, I suggest they are specifically targeted o increase the productivity of borrowers.  
Specific purpose loans are thus one potential avenue for microlenders to overcome the issues 
related to innovation adoption.  Additionally, the inclusion of specific purpose loans by 
microlenders will not require a complete change of their structure or significantly alter the 
human capital needed by loan officers to administer uch loans.  Moreover, networks of 
borrowers of the same type of specific purpose loans can be established to share best practices 
and promote the efficient use of resources in the future. 
However, specific purpose loans do require more judicial use than group lending 
previously required.  Oversaturating a market with suppliers of any one product is doomed to 
failure for both the borrowers and the microlender.  Additionally, the culpability of the 
microlender in the case of business failure is more in question due to the directed use of the loan 
proceeds. 
The results of this study also suggest incremental loans have no significant moderating 
effect on innovative behavior.  I had suggested that to the extent borrowers’ value access to 
future loans they would act more conservatively with their current loan proceeds, but the data did 
not support this.  One reason this could be is that innovators subjectively rate their risk of default 
as low.  Research on entrepreneurs in the United States has suggested that cognitive biases, such 
as overconfidence and the illusion of control, cause entrepreneurs to perceive their risk of failure 




default as low, regardless of how much they value future access to loans it may have no 
noticeable effect on their behavior.  Irrespective of why no significant results were found, the 
results of this study suggest providing an incentive o borrowers to repay the loan through an 
incremental loan process has little effect on whether borrowers behave innovatively or not, and 
should be continued by microlenders to the extent it reduces default. 
Borrowers that have access to alternative sources of credit also do not appear to adjust 
their behavior based on this fact.  However, in this study we did not account for the 
competitiveness of these other alternative sources of credit.  It is quite feasible that many of the 
borrowers reporting an alternative source of credit were referring to moneylenders, which often 
have less attractive loan terms, or family, which may have significantly better terms, when 
compared to microlenders.  Therefore this study’s results should not be taken as conclusive 
because the true relationship of alternative sources of credit and innovative behavior may be 
more nuanced than my data allows me to detect. 
Additionally, although previous studies have suggested wealth and income are correlated 
with risk preferences, the overwhelming significance of these items in predicting borrower 
behavior is worth noting.  While this study attempted o highlight ways in which microlending 
may be inhibiting innovation adoption, another line of research is attempting to understand how 
to promote innovation adoption by reducing the wealth nd income effect on risk aversion.  A 
pilot program is currently underway in Northeast Ethiopia that provides borrowers weather 
insurance for loans used to purchase fertilizer.  While fertilizer use generally increases yields, at 
the high-end and low-end of rainfall it has a negative return to investment (Dercon et al., 2011).  
Additionally, Dercon and colleagues (2011) suggested purchasing fertilizer decreases a farmer’s 




less diversified (more dependent on a good harvest), and less able to cope with a poor harvest.  
The weather insurance program is tied to loans offered to purchase fertilizers.  If the weather 
stations placed around Northeast Ethiopia report to li tle or too much rain the insurance covers 
the borrowers’ loan amount.  The object of this pilot program is to test whether providing 
weather insurance, which reduces the downside risk of using fertilizers, increases fertilizer use 
among Ethiopian farmers.  I suggest that this type of insurance scheme may be applied to other 
areas beyond fertilizer use in order to reduce the downside risk of investing in innovative 
businesses, and ultimately increase economic growth at t e base-of-the-pyramid. 
While this study is an initial step into understanding the potential unintended 
consequences of group lending, there are many limitations.  First, the study utilizes cross-
sectional data, and is thus unable to speak to the direction of causality.  While I make the 
assumption that personality traits precede the act of taking a loan, a longitudinal study could 
make stronger inferences about causality.  Additionally, a longitudinal study could examine the 
relationship between loan type, innovative behavior, and changes in income.  Another 
shortcoming of this study is that it relies heavily on self-report measures.  This may be 
particularly troubling regarding the measures of innovative behavior.  A subsequent study could 
attempt to objectively measure the innovativeness of borrowers.  Lastly, I want to point out that 
data for this study was collected exclusively from Ethiopia and does not necessarily generalize to 
other contexts where microloans are offered. 
Another issue, which we lament not being able to discuss at length in this study, is 
whether debt financing is the optimal method for spurring economic growth.  In much of the 
developed world equity financing is the key tool used to promote innovative businesses.  A 




innovation-based economic growth than the current system of microloans.  Microfranchising, a 
system similar to franchising in developed countries, s a step in the direction of a sustainable 
micro-equity system (Fairbourne, 2006).  Microfranchisors have a stake in the growth and 
continued success of their franchisees that is analogous to a venture capitalists’ stake in an 
innovative start-up.  Moreover, the success of microfranchises such as Honey Care Africa, 
suggest this may be a viable alternative or complement to microlending. 
 Lastly, I want to note that although microlending has become big business in the 
developing world, and there has been significant research conducted on the topic, there is still a 
large amount of research to be done.  For instance, littl  is known about how borrowers actually 
invest loan proceeds, how often group borrowers turnover and why, the impact of default on 
borrowers, or whether borrowers use a fourth loan differently than the first loan?  Additionally, 
researchers should not lose sight of the fact that billions of individuals live in abject poverty 
around the world.  Research on topics related to economic development and poverty alleviation 
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